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fix: cross-platform multi-workspace trust boundary (#417)

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* fix: relax workspace trust boundary to user home directory

The previous restriction required workspaces to be under DEFAULT_WORKSPACE
(/home/hermes/workspace), which blocked all profile-specific workspaces
(~/CodePath, ~/General, ~/WebUI, ~/Camanji, etc.) since each profile uses
a different directory under home.

New boundary: any directory under Path.home() is trusted.
This still blocks /etc, /tmp, /var, /root, /usr and all paths outside the
user's home, while allowing any legitimate workspace under ~/

Also updates test assertions from 'trusted workspace root' to 'outside'
since the new error message says 'outside the user home directory'.

* fix: workspace trust uses home-dir + saved-list, not single ancestor

Three-layer trust model that works cross-platform and multi-workspace:

1. BLOCKLIST: /etc, /usr, /var, /bin, /sbin, /boot, /proc, /sys, /dev, /root,
   /lib, /lib64, /opt/homebrew — always rejected, even if somehow saved
2. HOME CHECK: any path under Path.home() is trusted — covers ~/CodePath,
   ~/hermes-webui-public, ~/WebUI, ~/General, ~/Camanji simultaneously;
   Path.home() is cross-platform (Linux ~/..., macOS ~/..., Windows C:\Users\...\...)
3. SAVED LIST ESCAPE HATCH: if a path is already in the saved workspace list,
   it's trusted regardless of location — covers self-hosted deployments where
   workspaces live outside home (/data/projects, /opt/workspace, etc.)

None/empty → DEFAULT_WORKSPACE (always trusted, validated at startup)

* docs: v0.50.35 release — version badge and CHANGELOG

---------

Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
nesquena-hermes
2026-04-13 23:57:51 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 2a7a5ddfaf
commit 415270ff03
4 changed files with 77 additions and 18 deletions
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14
CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
# Hermes Web UI -- Changelog
## [v0.50.35] fix: workspace trust boundary — cross-platform, multi-workspace support
v0.50.34's workspace trust check was too restrictive: it required all workspaces to be under `DEFAULT_WORKSPACE` (/home/hermes/workspace), which blocked every profile-specific workspace (~/CodePath, ~/hermes-webui-public, ~/WebUI, ~/Camanji, etc.) and prevented switching between workspaces at all.
Replaced with a three-layer model that works cross-platform and supports multiple workspaces per profile:
1. **Blocklist** — `/etc`, `/usr`, `/var`, `/bin`, `/sbin`, `/boot`, `/proc`, `/sys`, `/dev`, `/root`, `/lib`, `/lib64`, `/opt/homebrew` always rejected, closing the original CVSS 8.8 vulnerability
2. **Home-directory check** — any path under `Path.home()` is trusted; `Path.home()` is cross-platform (`~/...` on Linux/macOS, `C:\\Users\\...` on Windows); allows all profile workspaces simultaneously since they don't need to share a single ancestor
3. **Saved-workspace escape hatch** — paths already in the profile's saved workspace list are trusted regardless of location, covering self-hosted deployments with workspaces outside home (`/data/projects`, `/opt/workspace`, etc.)
- `api/workspace.py`: rewritten `resolve_trusted_workspace()` with the three-layer model
- `tests/test_sprint3.py`: updated error-message assertions from `"trusted workspace root"` → `"outside"` (covers both old and new error strings)
- 1053 tests total (unchanged)
## [v0.50.34] fix(workspace): restrict session workspaces to trusted roots [SECURITY] (#415)
Session creation, update, chat-start, and workspace-add endpoints accepted arbitrary caller-supplied workspace paths. An authenticated caller could repoint a session to any directory the process could access, then use normal file read/write APIs to operate on attacker-chosen locations. CVSS 8.8 High (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).