* fix: restore mobile chat scrolling and drawer close (#397)
- static/style.css: add min-height:0 to .layout and .main (flex shrink chain fix for mobile scroll)
- static/style.css: add -webkit-overflow-scrolling:touch, touch-action:pan-y, overscroll-behavior-y:contain to .messages
- static/boot.js: call closeMobileSidebar() on new-conversation button onclick and Ctrl+K shortcut
- tests/test_mobile_layout.py: 41 new lines covering all three CSS fixes and both JS call sites
Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF
* fix: preserve imported session timestamps (#395)
- api/models.py: add touch_updated_at: bool = True param to Session.save(); import_cli_session() accepts created_at/updated_at kwargs and saves with touch_updated_at=False
- api/routes.py: extract created_at/updated_at from get_cli_sessions() metadata and forward to import_cli_session(); use touch_updated_at=False on post-import save
- tests/test_gateway_sync.py: +53 lines — integration test verifying imported session keeps original timestamp and sorts correctly vs newer sessions; also fix: add WebUI session file cleanup in finally block
Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF
* fix(profiles): block path traversal in profile switch and delete flows (#399)
Master was vulnerable: switch_profile and delete_profile_api joined user-supplied profile
names directly into filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker could send
'../../etc/passwd' as a profile name to traverse outside the profiles directory.
- api/profiles.py: add _resolve_named_profile_home(name) — validates name with
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$ regex then enforces path containment via
candidate.resolve().relative_to(profiles_root); use in switch_profile()
- api/profiles.py: add _validate_profile_name() call to delete_profile_api() entry
- api/routes.py: add _validate_profile_name() call at HTTP handler level for
both /api/profile/switch and /api/profile/delete (fail-fast at API boundary)
- tests/test_profile_path_security.py: 3 tests — traversal rejected, valid name passes
Cherry-picked commit aae7a30 from @Hinotoi-agent (PR was 62 commits behind master)
* feat: add desktop microphone transcription fallback (#396)
Mic button now works in browsers that support getUserMedia/MediaRecorder but
lack SpeechRecognition (e.g. Firefox desktop, some Chromium builds).
- static/boot.js: detect _canRecordAudio (navigator.mediaDevices + getUserMedia + MediaRecorder);
keep mic button enabled when either SpeechRecognition or MediaRecorder is available;
MediaRecorder fallback records audio, sends blob to /api/transcribe, inserts transcript
into the composer; _stopMic() handles all three states (recognition, mediaRecorder, neither)
- api/upload.py: add transcribe_audio() helper — saves uploaded blob to temp file, calls
transcription_tools.transcribe_audio(), always cleans up temp file
- api/routes.py: add /api/transcribe POST handler — CSRF protected, auth-gated, 20MB limit,
returns {text:...} or {error:...}
- api/helpers.py: change Permissions-Policy microphone=() to microphone=(self) (required to
allow getUserMedia in the same origin)
- tests/test_voice_transcribe_endpoint.py: 87 new lines — 3 tests with mocked transcription
- tests/test_sprint19.py: +1 regression guard (microphone=(self) in Permissions-Policy)
- tests/test_sprint20.py: 3 updated tests for new fallback-capability checks
Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF
* docs: v0.50.25 release — version badge and CHANGELOG
---------
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
* security: fix four audit findings -- env race, signing key, upload traversal, password hash
1. Race condition in os.environ (HIGH): Per-session _agent_lock didn't
prevent cross-session env writes from interleaving. Added global
_ENV_LOCK in streaming.py that serializes the entire env save/restore
block across all sessions.
2. Predictable signing key (MEDIUM): sha256(STATE_DIR) was deterministic.
Now generates a random 32-byte key on first startup and persists it to
STATE_DIR/.signing_key (chmod 600). Existing sessions invalidated on
first restart (acceptable for a security fix).
3. Upload path traversal (MEDIUM): Filename '..' survived the regex
sanitization (dots are allowed chars). Added explicit rejection of
dot-only names and safe_resolve_ws() check to verify the resolved
path stays within the workspace.
4. Weak password hashing (MEDIUM): Replaced bare SHA-256 with PBKDF2-
SHA256 (600k iterations per OWASP). Uses stdlib hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac,
no new dependencies. Note: existing passwords must be re-set after
this change (hash format changed).
Closes#106
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: use random signing key as PBKDF2 salt (replaces predictable STATE_DIR salt)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tracebacks exposed file paths, module names, and potentially secret
values from local variables. Now logged server-side only; clients
receive a generic error message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
