Three security issues found during review:
1. password_hash exposed via GET /api/settings
load_settings() returned all fields including the stored hash.
Fix: strip password_hash from the response in routes.py.
2. password_hash directly settable via POST /api/settings
'password_hash' was in _SETTINGS_ALLOWED_KEYS, so an attacker
could POST {password_hash: 'X'} to hijack auth without knowing
the current password.
Fix: exclude password_hash from _SETTINGS_ALLOWED_KEYS.
(Use _set_password for the legitimate hash-and-store path.)
3. Security headers missing from /api/auth/login and /api/auth/logout
These endpoints built their responses manually (bypassing j()),
so they omitted X-Content-Type-Options etc.
Fix: call _security_headers() before end_headers() on both.
Tests updated: renamed test to assert key absent (not just None),
added new test verifying direct password_hash POST is blocked.
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes#23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
