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3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
nesquena-hermes
9a5435176d fix: broaden session ID validator to support new hermes-agent format (#212) 
* fix: broaden session ID validator to support new hermes-agent format

* test: add more path traversal evil IDs to session validator test

Add null byte, backslash, forward slash, and dot-extension variants
to the rejected session ID test to cover additional attack vectors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-10 00:00:02 -07:00
Nathan Esquenazi
5e899ee8fe feat: notification sound and browser notifications on task completion 
Add two new settings (both default off):
- sound_enabled: plays a short tone via Web Audio API when assistant
  finishes a response or requests approval
- notifications_enabled: shows a browser notification when a response
  completes while the tab is in the background

Uses Web Audio API (oscillator) instead of bundled MP3 file — zero
additional assets. Follows the standard 4-file settings pattern.

Also skip test_valid_skill_accepted when hermes-agent not installed
(skills endpoint returns 500 without the agent module).

Inspired by #176 (DavidSchuchert)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-08 09:02:02 -07:00
nesquena-hermes
a064542df9 release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171) 
* Security: harden auth, CSRF, SSRF, XSS, and env race conditions

Twelve fixes from a full security audit:

CRITICAL
- Add CSRF Origin/Referer validation on all POST endpoints
  (prevents cross-origin abuse of self-update, settings, file ops)

HIGH
- Unify password hashing: config.py now uses PBKDF2 (600k iters)
  instead of single-iteration SHA-256
- Add per-IP rate limiting on login (5 attempts/60s, 429 on excess)

MEDIUM
- Validate session IDs as hex-only before filesystem operations
  (prevents path traversal via crafted session ID)
- SSRF: resolve DNS before private-IP check in model fetching
  (prevents DNS rebinding to internal services)
- Warn loudly when binding non-loopback without password set
- SSE env var mutations: wrap sync chat + streaming restore in _ENV_LOCK
- Force Content-Disposition:attachment for HTML/XHTML/SVG uploads
  (prevents stored XSS via uploaded files)

LOW
- Extend HMAC session signature from 64 to 128 bits
- Add resolve()+relative_to() check on skills path construction
- Set Secure flag on session cookie when connection is HTTPS
- Sanitize exception messages to strip filesystem paths

No breaking changes. All fixes are backward-compatible.

* fix: use getattr for Secure cookie SSL detection

handler.request.getpeercert raises AttributeError on plain sockets
(non-SSL). Use getattr(..., None) to safely check for SSL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* tests: add sprint 29 security hardening coverage (PR #171)

33 tests covering all 12 security fixes:
- CSRF origin/referer validation
- Login rate limiting (5 attempts/60s)
- Session ID hex validation (path traversal prevention)
- Error path sanitization (_sanitize_error)
- Secure cookie getattr safety
- HMAC signature length (64->128 bit)
- Skills path traversal prevention
- Content-Disposition for HTML/SVG/XHTML
- PBKDF2 password hashing verification
- Non-loopback startup warning
- SSRF DNS guard code presence
- _ENV_LOCK export from streaming module

* release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171)

---------

Co-authored-by: betamod <matthew.sloly@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-07 22:26:03 -07:00