Pinned all 7 third-party actions from mutable version tags to immutable
commit SHAs. Mutable tags (e.g. @v4) can be force-pushed by the action
author (or a compromised account) to inject malicious code into the workflow,
which runs with write access to the repo and GHCR registry.
Also moved 'permissions' from workflow level to job level (best practice:
scope permissions as narrowly as possible).
Pin mapping:
actions/checkout@v4 -> @11bd71901bbe... (v4.2.2)
softprops/action-gh-release@v2 -> @c062e08bd532... (v2.2.1)
docker/setup-qemu-action@v3 -> @49b3bc8e6bdd... (v3.2.0)
docker/setup-buildx-action@v3 -> @c47758b77c97... (v3.7.1)
docker/login-action@v3 -> @9780b0c442fb... (v3.3.0)
docker/metadata-action@v5 -> @369eb591f429... (v5.6.1)
docker/build-push-action@v6 -> @ca877d9245fe... (v6.10.0)
On tag push (v*):
- Creates a GitHub Release with auto-generated release notes
- Builds multi-arch Docker image (linux/amd64, linux/arm64)
- Pushes to ghcr.io/nesquena/hermes-webui with semver tags
- Uses GitHub Actions cache for faster builds
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
