* fix: restore mobile chat scrolling and drawer close (#397)
- static/style.css: add min-height:0 to .layout and .main (flex shrink chain fix for mobile scroll)
- static/style.css: add -webkit-overflow-scrolling:touch, touch-action:pan-y, overscroll-behavior-y:contain to .messages
- static/boot.js: call closeMobileSidebar() on new-conversation button onclick and Ctrl+K shortcut
- tests/test_mobile_layout.py: 41 new lines covering all three CSS fixes and both JS call sites
Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF
* fix: preserve imported session timestamps (#395)
- api/models.py: add touch_updated_at: bool = True param to Session.save(); import_cli_session() accepts created_at/updated_at kwargs and saves with touch_updated_at=False
- api/routes.py: extract created_at/updated_at from get_cli_sessions() metadata and forward to import_cli_session(); use touch_updated_at=False on post-import save
- tests/test_gateway_sync.py: +53 lines — integration test verifying imported session keeps original timestamp and sorts correctly vs newer sessions; also fix: add WebUI session file cleanup in finally block
Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF
* fix(profiles): block path traversal in profile switch and delete flows (#399)
Master was vulnerable: switch_profile and delete_profile_api joined user-supplied profile
names directly into filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker could send
'../../etc/passwd' as a profile name to traverse outside the profiles directory.
- api/profiles.py: add _resolve_named_profile_home(name) — validates name with
^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$ regex then enforces path containment via
candidate.resolve().relative_to(profiles_root); use in switch_profile()
- api/profiles.py: add _validate_profile_name() call to delete_profile_api() entry
- api/routes.py: add _validate_profile_name() call at HTTP handler level for
both /api/profile/switch and /api/profile/delete (fail-fast at API boundary)
- tests/test_profile_path_security.py: 3 tests — traversal rejected, valid name passes
Cherry-picked commit aae7a30 from @Hinotoi-agent (PR was 62 commits behind master)
* feat: add desktop microphone transcription fallback (#396)
Mic button now works in browsers that support getUserMedia/MediaRecorder but
lack SpeechRecognition (e.g. Firefox desktop, some Chromium builds).
- static/boot.js: detect _canRecordAudio (navigator.mediaDevices + getUserMedia + MediaRecorder);
keep mic button enabled when either SpeechRecognition or MediaRecorder is available;
MediaRecorder fallback records audio, sends blob to /api/transcribe, inserts transcript
into the composer; _stopMic() handles all three states (recognition, mediaRecorder, neither)
- api/upload.py: add transcribe_audio() helper — saves uploaded blob to temp file, calls
transcription_tools.transcribe_audio(), always cleans up temp file
- api/routes.py: add /api/transcribe POST handler — CSRF protected, auth-gated, 20MB limit,
returns {text:...} or {error:...}
- api/helpers.py: change Permissions-Policy microphone=() to microphone=(self) (required to
allow getUserMedia in the same origin)
- tests/test_voice_transcribe_endpoint.py: 87 new lines — 3 tests with mocked transcription
- tests/test_sprint19.py: +1 regression guard (microphone=(self) in Permissions-Policy)
- tests/test_sprint20.py: 3 updated tests for new fallback-capability checks
Original PR by @Jordan-SkyLF
* docs: v0.50.25 release — version badge and CHANGELOG
---------
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
Three security issues found during review:
1. password_hash exposed via GET /api/settings
load_settings() returned all fields including the stored hash.
Fix: strip password_hash from the response in routes.py.
2. password_hash directly settable via POST /api/settings
'password_hash' was in _SETTINGS_ALLOWED_KEYS, so an attacker
could POST {password_hash: 'X'} to hijack auth without knowing
the current password.
Fix: exclude password_hash from _SETTINGS_ALLOWED_KEYS.
(Use _set_password for the legitimate hash-and-store path.)
3. Security headers missing from /api/auth/login and /api/auth/logout
These endpoints built their responses manually (bypassing j()),
so they omitted X-Content-Type-Options etc.
Fix: call _security_headers() before end_headers() on both.
Tests updated: renamed test to assert key absent (not just None),
added new test verifying direct password_hash POST is blocked.
Auth system (off by default, zero friction for localhost):
- New api/auth.py module: password hashing (SHA-256 + STATE_DIR salt),
signed HMAC session cookies (24h TTL), auth middleware
- Enable via HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var or Settings panel
- Minimal dark-themed login page at /login (self-contained HTML)
- POST /api/auth/login, /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/status
- Settings panel: "Access Password" field + "Sign Out" button
- password_hash added to settings.json (null = auth disabled)
Security hardening:
- Security headers on all responses: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,
X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy: same-origin
- POST body size limit: 20MB cap in read_body() to prevent DoS
Closes#23. 9 new tests. Total: 304 passed, 0 regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
