Files
webui/api/auth.py
nesquena-hermes a064542df9 release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171)
* Security: harden auth, CSRF, SSRF, XSS, and env race conditions

Twelve fixes from a full security audit:

CRITICAL
- Add CSRF Origin/Referer validation on all POST endpoints
  (prevents cross-origin abuse of self-update, settings, file ops)

HIGH
- Unify password hashing: config.py now uses PBKDF2 (600k iters)
  instead of single-iteration SHA-256
- Add per-IP rate limiting on login (5 attempts/60s, 429 on excess)

MEDIUM
- Validate session IDs as hex-only before filesystem operations
  (prevents path traversal via crafted session ID)
- SSRF: resolve DNS before private-IP check in model fetching
  (prevents DNS rebinding to internal services)
- Warn loudly when binding non-loopback without password set
- SSE env var mutations: wrap sync chat + streaming restore in _ENV_LOCK
- Force Content-Disposition:attachment for HTML/XHTML/SVG uploads
  (prevents stored XSS via uploaded files)

LOW
- Extend HMAC session signature from 64 to 128 bits
- Add resolve()+relative_to() check on skills path construction
- Set Secure flag on session cookie when connection is HTTPS
- Sanitize exception messages to strip filesystem paths

No breaking changes. All fixes are backward-compatible.

* fix: use getattr for Secure cookie SSL detection

handler.request.getpeercert raises AttributeError on plain sockets
(non-SSL). Use getattr(..., None) to safely check for SSL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* tests: add sprint 29 security hardening coverage (PR #171)

33 tests covering all 12 security fixes:
- CSRF origin/referer validation
- Login rate limiting (5 attempts/60s)
- Session ID hex validation (path traversal prevention)
- Error path sanitization (_sanitize_error)
- Secure cookie getattr safety
- HMAC signature length (64->128 bit)
- Skills path traversal prevention
- Content-Disposition for HTML/SVG/XHTML
- PBKDF2 password hashing verification
- Non-loopback startup warning
- SSRF DNS guard code presence
- _ENV_LOCK export from streaming module

* release: v0.39.0 — security hardening, 12 fixes (#171)

---------

Co-authored-by: betamod <matthew.sloly@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-07 22:26:03 -07:00

194 lines
6.6 KiB
Python

"""
Hermes Web UI -- Optional password authentication.
Off by default. Enable by setting HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD env var
or configuring a password in the Settings panel.
"""
import hashlib
import hmac
import http.cookies
import os
import secrets
import time
from api.config import STATE_DIR, load_settings
# ── Public paths (no auth required) ─────────────────────────────────────────
PUBLIC_PATHS = frozenset({
'/login', '/health', '/favicon.ico',
'/api/auth/login', '/api/auth/status',
})
COOKIE_NAME = 'hermes_session'
SESSION_TTL = 86400 # 24 hours
# Active sessions: token -> expiry timestamp
_sessions = {}
# ── Login rate limiter ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
_login_attempts = {} # ip -> [timestamp, ...]
_LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5
_LOGIN_WINDOW = 60 # seconds
def _check_login_rate(ip: str) -> bool:
"""Return True if the IP is allowed to attempt login."""
now = time.time()
attempts = _login_attempts.get(ip, [])
# Prune old attempts
attempts = [t for t in attempts if now - t < _LOGIN_WINDOW]
_login_attempts[ip] = attempts
return len(attempts) < _LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS
def _record_login_attempt(ip: str) -> None:
now = time.time()
attempts = _login_attempts.get(ip, [])
attempts.append(now)
_login_attempts[ip] = attempts
def _signing_key():
"""Return a random signing key, generating and persisting one on first call."""
key_file = STATE_DIR / '.signing_key'
if key_file.exists():
try:
raw = key_file.read_bytes()
if len(raw) >= 32:
return raw[:32]
except Exception:
pass
# Generate a new random key
key = secrets.token_bytes(32)
try:
STATE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
key_file.write_bytes(key)
key_file.chmod(0o600)
except Exception:
pass # key works for this process even if persist fails
return key
def _hash_password(password):
"""PBKDF2-SHA256 with 600k iterations (OWASP recommendation).
Salt is the persisted random signing key, which is secret and unique per
installation. This keeps the stored hash format a plain hex string
(no format change to settings.json) while replacing the predictable
STATE_DIR-derived salt from the original implementation."""
salt = _signing_key()
dk = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password.encode(), salt, 600_000)
return dk.hex()
def get_password_hash() -> str | None:
"""Return the active password hash, or None if auth is disabled.
Priority: env var > settings.json."""
env_pw = os.getenv('HERMES_WEBUI_PASSWORD', '').strip()
if env_pw:
return _hash_password(env_pw)
settings = load_settings()
return settings.get('password_hash') or None
def is_auth_enabled() -> bool:
"""True if a password is configured (env var or settings)."""
return get_password_hash() is not None
def verify_password(plain) -> bool:
"""Verify a plaintext password against the stored hash."""
expected = get_password_hash()
if not expected:
return False
return hmac.compare_digest(_hash_password(plain), expected)
def create_session() -> str:
"""Create a new auth session. Returns signed cookie value."""
token = secrets.token_hex(32)
_sessions[token] = time.time() + SESSION_TTL
sig = hmac.new(_signing_key(), token.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()[:32]
return f"{token}.{sig}"
def verify_session(cookie_value) -> bool:
"""Verify a signed session cookie. Returns True if valid and not expired."""
if not cookie_value or '.' not in cookie_value:
return False
token, sig = cookie_value.rsplit('.', 1)
expected_sig = hmac.new(_signing_key(), token.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()[:32]
if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected_sig):
return False
expiry = _sessions.get(token)
if not expiry or time.time() > expiry:
_sessions.pop(token, None)
return False
return True
def invalidate_session(cookie_value) -> None:
"""Remove a session token."""
if cookie_value and '.' in cookie_value:
token = cookie_value.rsplit('.', 1)[0]
_sessions.pop(token, None)
def parse_cookie(handler) -> str | None:
"""Extract the auth cookie from the request headers."""
cookie_header = handler.headers.get('Cookie', '')
if not cookie_header:
return None
cookie = http.cookies.SimpleCookie()
try:
cookie.load(cookie_header)
except http.cookies.CookieError:
return None
morsel = cookie.get(COOKIE_NAME)
return morsel.value if morsel else None
def check_auth(handler, parsed) -> bool:
"""Check if request is authorized. Returns True if OK.
If not authorized, sends 401 (API) or 302 redirect (page) and returns False."""
if not is_auth_enabled():
return True
# Public paths don't require auth
if parsed.path in PUBLIC_PATHS or parsed.path.startswith('/static/'):
return True
# Check session cookie
cookie_val = parse_cookie(handler)
if cookie_val and verify_session(cookie_val):
return True
# Not authorized
if parsed.path.startswith('/api/'):
handler.send_response(401)
handler.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json')
handler.end_headers()
handler.wfile.write(b'{"error":"Authentication required"}')
else:
handler.send_response(302)
handler.send_header('Location', '/login')
handler.end_headers()
return False
def set_auth_cookie(handler, cookie_value) -> None:
"""Set the auth cookie on the response."""
cookie = http.cookies.SimpleCookie()
cookie[COOKIE_NAME] = cookie_value
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['httponly'] = True
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['samesite'] = 'Lax'
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['path'] = '/'
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['max-age'] = str(SESSION_TTL)
# Set Secure flag when connection is HTTPS
if getattr(handler.request, 'getpeercert', None) is not None or handler.headers.get('X-Forwarded-Proto', '') == 'https':
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['secure'] = True
handler.send_header('Set-Cookie', cookie[COOKIE_NAME].OutputString())
def clear_auth_cookie(handler) -> None:
"""Clear the auth cookie on the response."""
cookie = http.cookies.SimpleCookie()
cookie[COOKIE_NAME] = ''
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['httponly'] = True
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['path'] = '/'
cookie[COOKIE_NAME]['max-age'] = '0'
handler.send_header('Set-Cookie', cookie[COOKIE_NAME].OutputString())