Files
webui/tests/test_security_redaction.py
nesquena-hermes 27c2fd6c08 v0.46.0: security, Docker UID/GID, model discovery, i18n, cancel fix
* fix: decode HTML entities before markdown processing + zh/zh-Hant translations (#239)

Adds decode() helper in renderMd() to fix double-escaping of HTML entities
from LLM output (e.g. <code> becoming <code> instead
of rendering). XSS-safe: decode runs before esc(), only 5 entity patterns.

Also adds 40+ missing zh (Simplified Chinese) translation keys and a new
zh-Hant (Traditional Chinese) locale with 163 keys.

Fix applied: removed duplicate settings_label_notifications key in both
zh and zh-Hant locales.

Fixes #240

* fix: restore custom model list discovery with config api key (#238)

get_available_models() now reads api_key from config.yaml before env vars:
  1. model.api_key
  2. providers.<active>.api_key / providers.custom.api_key
  3. env var fallbacks (HERMES_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.)

Also adds OpenAI/Python User-Agent header and a regression test covering
authenticated /v1/models discovery.

Fixes users with LM Studio / Ollama custom endpoints configured in
config.yaml whose model picker silently collapsed to the default model.

* feat: Docker UID/GID matching to avoid root-owned .hermes files (#237)

Adds docker_init.bash with hermeswebuitoo/hermeswebui user pattern so
container files match the host user UID/GID. Prevents .hermes volume
mounts from being owned by root when using a non-root host user.

Configure via WANTED_UID and WANTED_GID env vars (default 1000/1000).
Readme updated with setup instructions.

Fix applied: removed duplicate WANTED_GID=1000 line in docker-compose.yml
that was overriding the ${GID:-1000} variable expansion.

* security: redact credentials from API responses and fix credential file permissions (#243)

Adds response-layer credential redaction to three endpoints:
  - GET /api/session — messages[], tool_calls[], and title
  - GET /api/session/export — download also redacted
  - SSE done event — session payload in stream
  - GET /api/memory — MEMORY.md and USER.md content

Adds api/startup.py with fix_credential_permissions() at server startup.
Adds 13 tests in tests/test_security_redaction.py.

Merged with #237 container detection changes in server.py.

* fix: cancel button now interrupts agent and cleans up UI state (#244)

Wires agent.interrupt() into cancel_stream() so the backend actually
stops tool execution when the user clicks Cancel, rather than only
stopping the SSE stream while the agent keeps running.

Changes:
  - api/config.py: adds AGENT_INSTANCES dict (stream_id -> AIAgent)
  - api/streaming.py: stores agent in AGENT_INSTANCES after creation,
    checks CANCEL_FLAGS immediately after store (race condition fix),
    calls agent.interrupt() in cancel_stream(), cleans up in finally block
  - static/boot.js: removes stale setStatus(cancelling) call
  - static/messages.js: setBusy(false)/setStatus('') unconditionally on cancel

Race condition fix: after storing agent in AGENT_INSTANCES, immediately
checks if CANCEL_FLAGS[stream_id] is already set (cancel arrived during
agent init) and interrupts before starting. Check is inside the same
STREAMS_LOCK acquisition, making it atomic.

New test file: tests/test_cancel_interrupt.py with 6 unit tests.

* docs: v0.46.0 release notes, bump version, update test counts

---------

Co-authored-by: Nathan Esquenazi <nesquena@gmail.com>
2026-04-11 10:17:52 -07:00

311 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""
Security tests: credential redaction in API responses.
Verifies that credentials (GitHub PATs, API keys, etc.) are masked in:
- GET /api/session (messages and tool_calls)
- GET /api/memory (MEMORY.md and USER.md content)
- GET /api/session/export (downloaded JSON)
- SSE done event (session payload in stream)
Tests run against the isolated test test_server on port 8788.
"""
import json
import pathlib
import sys
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent))
def _server_is_up(port: int = 8788) -> bool:
"""Return True if the test server is accepting connections."""
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/health", timeout=2)
return True
except Exception:
return False
# _needs_server: these tests require the conftest test_server fixture (port 8788).
# The skipif is evaluated lazily via the fixture, not at collection time.
_needs_server = pytest.mark.usefixtures("test_server")
BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:8788"
# Sample credentials that should be masked in every API response
_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT = "ghp_TestFakeCredential1234567890ab"
_FAKE_SK_KEY = "sk-TestFakeOpenAIKey1234567890abcdef"
_FAKE_HF_TOKEN = "hf_TestFakeHuggingFaceToken12345"
_FAKE_AWS_KEY = "AKIATESTFAKEKEY12345"
# ── HTTP helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _get(path):
with urllib.request.urlopen(BASE + path, timeout=10) as r:
return json.loads(r.read())
def _post(path, body=None):
data = json.dumps(body or {}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
BASE + path, data=data,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as r:
return json.loads(r.read()), r.status
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
return json.loads(e.read()), e.code
def _get_raw(path):
"""Return raw bytes (used for export endpoint)."""
with urllib.request.urlopen(BASE + path, timeout=10) as r:
return r.read()
def _assert_no_plaintext_credentials(text: str, label: str = ""):
"""Assert that none of the fake credential strings appear in text."""
for cred in (_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT, _FAKE_SK_KEY, _FAKE_HF_TOKEN, _FAKE_AWS_KEY):
assert cred not in text, (
f"{label}: credential '{cred[:12]}...' found in plaintext. "
"Redaction is not working."
)
# ── helpers.py unit tests (import-level, no test_server needed) ───────────────────
def test_redact_value_str():
"""_redact_value masks a plaintext GitHub PAT in a string."""
from api.helpers import _redact_value
result = _redact_value(f"my token is {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT} bye")
assert _FAKE_GITHUB_PAT not in result
assert "ghp_Te" in result # prefix preserved
def test_redact_value_dict():
"""_redact_value recurses into dicts."""
from api.helpers import _redact_value
d = {"content": f"key={_FAKE_SK_KEY}", "role": "user"}
result = _redact_value(d)
assert _FAKE_SK_KEY not in result["content"]
assert result["role"] == "user" # innocent values untouched
def test_redact_value_list():
"""_redact_value recurses into lists."""
from api.helpers import _redact_value
lst = [{"content": _FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}, {"content": "safe text"}]
result = _redact_value(lst)
assert _FAKE_GITHUB_PAT not in result[0]["content"]
assert result[1]["content"] == "safe text"
def test_redact_session_data_messages():
"""redact_session_data masks credentials in messages[]."""
from api.helpers import redact_session_data
session = {
"session_id": "abc123",
"title": f"my token {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}",
"messages": [
{"role": "user", "content": f"token: {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": "sure"},
],
"tool_calls": [
{"name": "terminal", "args": {"command": f"gh auth login --token {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}"},
"snippet": "ok"},
],
}
result = redact_session_data(session)
dump = json.dumps(result)
_assert_no_plaintext_credentials(dump, "redact_session_data")
# Safe fields remain intact
assert result["session_id"] == "abc123"
assert result["messages"][1]["content"] == "sure"
def test_redact_session_data_multiple_cred_types():
"""redact_session_data handles sk-, ghp_, hf_, and AKIA keys."""
from api.helpers import redact_session_data
session = {
"title": "test",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": (
f"openai={_FAKE_SK_KEY} "
f"github={_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT} "
f"hf={_FAKE_HF_TOKEN} "
f"aws={_FAKE_AWS_KEY}"
)}],
"tool_calls": [],
}
result = redact_session_data(session)
dump = json.dumps(result)
_assert_no_plaintext_credentials(dump, "multi-type redaction")
def test_redact_session_data_non_sensitive_unchanged():
"""redact_session_data does not corrupt innocent content."""
from api.helpers import redact_session_data
session = {
"title": "Hello world",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "What is 2+2?"}],
"tool_calls": [{"name": "terminal", "snippet": "4"}],
}
result = redact_session_data(session)
assert result["title"] == "Hello world"
assert result["messages"][0]["content"] == "What is 2+2?"
assert result["tool_calls"][0]["snippet"] == "4"
# ── API-level tests (require running test server started by conftest.py) ─────
# Run via `start.sh && pytest tests/test_security_redaction.py -v`
def _create_session_with_credentials() -> str:
"""Write a session file with credential-containing messages directly to disk.
Bypasses the server's in-memory cache so the GET endpoint is forced to read
from disk, exercising the redaction code path on load.
Uses TEST_STATE_DIR from conftest.py (the isolated test server state directory).
"""
import time, uuid
try:
from conftest import TEST_STATE_DIR
sessions_dir = TEST_STATE_DIR / "sessions"
except ImportError:
from api.config import SESSION_DIR as sessions_dir
sessions_dir = pathlib.Path(sessions_dir)
sessions_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Use a unique session ID that is NOT in the server's LRU cache
sid = "sec_test_" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
now = time.time()
session_file = sessions_dir / f"{sid}.json"
session_file.write_text(json.dumps({
"session_id": sid,
"title": f"session with {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}",
"workspace": "/tmp",
"model": "test",
"created_at": now,
"updated_at": now,
"pinned": False, "archived": False, "project_id": None,
"profile": "default", "input_tokens": 0, "output_tokens": 0,
"estimated_cost": None, "personality": None,
"messages": [
{"role": "user", "content": f"my PAT is {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}"},
{"role": "assistant", "content": f"sk key is {_FAKE_SK_KEY}"},
{"role": "tool", "content": "result ok", "name": "terminal"},
],
"tool_calls": [
{"name": "terminal",
"args": {"command": f"gh auth login --token {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}"},
"snippet": "blocked"}
],
}))
return sid
def test_api_session_redacts_messages():
"""GET /api/session route must call redact_session_data() before returning."""
import inspect
import api.routes as routes
src = inspect.getsource(routes.handle_get)
# Verify redact_session_data is applied to the session payload
assert "redact_session_data" in src, (
"api/routes.py handle_get must call redact_session_data() on /api/session response"
)
def test_api_session_redacts_title():
"""redact_session_data must redact credentials from session title field."""
from api.helpers import redact_session_data
session = {
"session_id": "abc123",
"title": f"session with {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}",
"messages": [],
"tool_calls": [],
}
result = redact_session_data(session)
assert _FAKE_GITHUB_PAT not in result["title"], (
f"redact_session_data must mask credentials in title field"
)
assert result["session_id"] == "abc123" # safe fields preserved
@_needs_server
def test_api_sessions_list_redacts_titles(test_server):
"""GET /api/sessions must not return session titles containing credentials."""
_create_session_with_credentials()
data = _get("/api/sessions")
dump = json.dumps(data)
_assert_no_plaintext_credentials(dump, "GET /api/sessions titles")
def test_api_session_export_redacts():
"""GET /api/session/export must call redact_session_data() in _handle_session_export."""
import inspect
import api.routes as routes
# The export handler is a separate function (_handle_session_export)
src = inspect.getsource(routes._handle_session_export)
assert "redact_session_data" in src, (
"_handle_session_export must call redact_session_data() before serving download"
)
@_needs_server
def test_api_memory_redacts_via_write_read(test_server):
"""Credential written to MEMORY.md must be masked in GET /api/memory response."""
original = _get("/api/memory").get("memory", "")
cred_content = f"GitHub PAT: {_FAKE_GITHUB_PAT}\nNormal note: hello world"
data, status = _post("/api/memory/write", {"section": "memory", "content": cred_content})
assert status == 200, f"memory/write failed: {data}"
try:
read_back = _get("/api/memory")
dump = json.dumps(read_back)
_assert_no_plaintext_credentials(dump, "GET /api/memory")
assert "hello world" in read_back["memory"] # non-sensitive content preserved
finally:
_post("/api/memory/write", {"section": "memory", "content": original})
# ── startup: fix_credential_permissions ──────────────────────────────────────
def test_fix_credential_permissions_corrects_loose_files(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""fix_credential_permissions() tightens group/other read bits."""
import os
from api.startup import fix_credential_permissions
env_file = tmp_path / ".env"
env_file.write_text("SECRET=abc")
env_file.chmod(0o644) # world-readable -- should be fixed
google_file = tmp_path / "google_token.json"
google_file.write_text("{}")
google_file.chmod(0o664) # group-readable -- should be fixed
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path))
fix_credential_permissions()
import stat
assert stat.S_IMODE(env_file.stat().st_mode) == 0o600, ".env not fixed to 600"
assert stat.S_IMODE(google_file.stat().st_mode) == 0o600, "google_token.json not fixed to 600"
def test_fix_credential_permissions_skips_correct_files(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""fix_credential_permissions() does not alter already-strict files."""
env_file = tmp_path / ".env"
env_file.write_text("SECRET=abc")
env_file.chmod(0o600)
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path))
from api.startup import fix_credential_permissions
fix_credential_permissions()
import stat
assert stat.S_IMODE(env_file.stat().st_mode) == 0o600